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INVESTIGATION
A pill too hard to swallow: how the NHS is limiting
access to high priced drugs
A joint investigation by The BMJ and Cambridge and Bath universities uncovers how NHS England
tried to limit access to expensive new drugs for hepatitis C. Jonathan Gornall, Amanda Hoey, and
Piotr Ozieranski report
Jonathan Gornall freelance journalist 1, Amanda Hoey consultant, Piotr Ozieranski lecturer 3
1Suffolk, UK; 2Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK; 3Department of Social and Policy Sciences, University of Bath,
Bath, UK
Highly priced medicines are challenging health systems around
the world in unprecedented ways. And none more so than the
new sofosbuvir based antiviral drugs introduced by Gilead
Sciences in 2014. Offering greatly reduced treatment durations
and high cure rates, these medicines hold out the real prospect
of eliminating hepatitis C in countries where they are widely
administered, with all that implies for long term savings in
healthcare costs.
But launch of these drugs has ignited a global debate about high
priced medicines. With launch prices ranging from around $90
000 (£69 000; €82 000) per patient in the US to almost £35 000
in England and €41 000 in France,1 they have sparked a US
Senate investigation (box), been raised at both the G7 and G20
summits, and has been a major consideration for to a UN high
level panel on access to medicines.
The hepatitis C medicines have intensified tensions between
drug companies’ duty to put shareholders’ interests first and
governments with limited health resources. Sofosbuvir is not
the first high priced medicine. Many novel cancer medicines
provide only marginal benefits but cost over $100 000 per
patient a year. But because hepatitis C affects so many people
it has become a pill too hard to swallow for budget planners.
Rationing, in their view, became inevitable.
Now there is new evidence about the extent to which hepatitis
C treatments have challenged one of themost developed systems
for assessing the value of new therapies and delivering them to
patients: the NHS and the National Institute for Health and Care
Excellence (NICE) in England.
In a joint investigation, The BMJ and researchers from the
University of Cambridge and the University of Bath, show how
NHS England, unable to budget for broad access to these drugs,
tried to alter the outcome of the NICE process and, when it
failed, defied NICE’s authority by rationing access to the drugs.
Our investigation finds that NHS England was unable to adopt
innovative funding mechanisms to reduce the price because of
NHS procurement law.
In interviews with clinicians, patient groups, and drug company
representatives, a picture emerges of how NHS England failed
to plan ahead for expensive drugs it knew were in the pipeline,
exaggerated the numbers likely to come forward for treatment
and the financial burden for them in its submissions to NICE,
and, in a “shroud waving” exercise, claimed thousands of other
NHS patients would die if NICE gave the go ahead to the
hepatitis C drugs.
The case shows how high prices for high prevalence diseases
places huge stress on health systems and reveals the limitations
of conventional cost effectiveness analysis. Although NICE
may deem such medicines to be cost effective, the NHS is ill
equipped to deal with the budgetary allocations required. This
leads to conflict and damaging delays for patients. It also reveals
an urgent need for reform to allow better deal making,
transparent pricing, and new payment models, such as the one
used to make the hepatitis C drugs available in Australia.
Hepatitis C medicines
By the end of last year, NICE had issued a series of guidelines,
including approval for widespread use of two Gilead drugs for
hepatitis C. First came sofosbuvir (Sovaldi),2 in February 2015,
followed by the oral combination ledipasvir-sofosbuvir
(Harvoni) in November.3 Competitor treatments from drug
companies AbbVie and Bristol-Myers Squibb were also
approved.4
These drugs should have been widely available to NHS patients
after a statutory 90 days.5 But for the first time, this has not
happened.
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Before the NICE process was complete, NHS England took care
to ensure that the sickest patients— people with liver failure
whomight die before the guidelines were issued—were treated.
In 2014, it set up an early access programme for patients with
advanced liver disease,6 followed by a new £150m fund in June
2015 to treat patients with cirrhosis of the liver caused by
chronic hepatitis C—nearly 5000 people in total.7
But according to Public Health England an estimated 214 000
people have chronic hepatitis C infection in the UK, 160 000
of whom are in England.8 Most of them are still waiting for
treatment with the drugs that NICE has approved.
In apparent panic over high prices and affordability, NHS
England deployed many delaying tactics to block timely access
to the hepatitis C drugs. It delayed acting on NICE
recommendations on sofosbuvir by requesting a three month
extension to implement the guidance, on top of the mandatory
90 days, saying it needed time to set up a proper database to
audit patients and use of the new drug.
NHS England went on to try to completely block Harvoni and
two other competitor drugs by questioning the level of evidence
for the new treatments. NICE prevailed and eventually, in
November 2015, published guidance recommending these drugs
for the most patients with hepatitis C. But NHS England has
restricted use of the new drugs by imposing quotas on clinical
teams around the country.
NHS England says its delivery of the drugs is within NICE
guidance. Expert clinicians do not agree and are angered by its
tactics.
In April 2015, onemember of NHS England's six person clinical
advisory group, brought together from members of the
hepatology and infectious diseases clinical reference groups,
resigned in protest at NHS England's attempts to delay access
to the treatments.
“I pulled out of the advisory group on principle, because of
everything that was going on,” said Andrew Ustianowski, a
consultant in infectious diseases at Pennine Acute Hospitals
NHS Trust. “I didn’t want to be associated with what was
happening.”
There were, he says, “multiple things,” but the final straw was
an NHS England response to the NICE consultations on the
hepatitis C drugs. “They said the advisory group was agreeing
that the treatment centres around the country hadn't got the
capacity and that’s wrong—of course there’s capacity to treat
more people. I just got to the stage where I didn’t want to be
associated with delaying patients getting access to the
treatments.”
Steve Ryder, a hepatologist from Queen’s Medical Centre,
University of Nottingham, chair of advocacy organisation HCV
Action, and a fellow member of the hepatitis advisory group,
had other issues with NHS England's submissions to NICE.
“Its position was that the hepatitis C drugs were unaffordable
and the figure they quoted in the NICE submission was
something like £2bn, which was clearly fantasy,” he said. “The
assumption to come up with that figure was that you had no
discounts on any of the drugs at all and that every single person
with hepatitis C in England would come forward that year for
treatment, so it was a completely ridiculous standpoint to take.”
NHS England is also accused of pursuing the broader agenda
of trying to hamper NICE's ability to impose budget busting
drugs on the health service, and of having cynically chosen this
battleground because most people with hepatitis C infection are
from marginalised groups without a voice, such as people who
inject drugs.8
“The difficulty is that NICE looks at cost effectiveness over a
long period and says a drug is cost effective because it’s saving
people from dying or having problems years down the road,”
says Ustianowski, “and cost effectiveness is very different from
budget impact, which is what NHS England is facing.”
As a result, “I think some people in NHS England would love
to clip NICE’s wings and turn it into a kind of recommendatory
rather than mandatory body. And if you are going to choose a
fight then choosing this battlefield is quite a sensible thing to
do—a marginalised population, very high cost drugs.” Once
people are infected with hepatitis C, progression of the disease
can be slow and transition rates to cirrhosis and liver failure are
hard to predict. “People don’t have symptoms for years or
cirrhosis for decades. So once you’ve treated the obviously sick
and those with cirrhosis, who do you treat next?” says
Ustianowski. “I think they’ve chosen this fight quite well.”
Sofosbuvir appraisal—first struggle to
delay access
Although NICE's technology appraisal guidance was published
in February 2015, an unprecedented delaying tactic by NHS
England ensured that sofosbuvir was not available until 1 August
2015, 10 months later than expected by doctors and patients.
This was largely because of NHS England obtaining exemption
from its statutory 90 day obligation. In a letter to NICE, dated
19 November 2014, it claimed, in essence, that it wasn't ready
to deal with the large numbers of patients expected to come
forward for treatment.
Such a request for delay was almost unprecedented, but NICE
bowed to it despite almost unanimous opposition from other
consulted groups, including the British Association for the Study
of the Liver and the British Viral Hepatitis Group, British HIV
Association and British Association for Sexual Health and HIV,
the British Liver Trust, Haemophilia Society, Royal College of
Pathologists, and the Royal College of Physicians. The
Department of Health alone thought that NHS England had “put
forward a valid case for deferring the funding period.”9
In its response to NICE, Gilead said NHS England's claims
about the numbers of patients were “unsupported by evidence,
and all information available to Gilead indicates that they are
factually incorrect.”
The Hepatitis C Trust pointed out to NICE that NHS England
had known about the technology “for at least 18 months” and
it would be “unconscionable that patients should be made to
wait simply because NHS England has dragged its feet.” “If we
are going to change our healthcare resource allocation model
to one based on the arbitrary consideration of this year’s
budget,” it added, “then this should be debated nationally,
preferably through an election manifesto. Either NICE has a
mandate to decide resource allocation or it doesn’t.”
In a joint submission, the British Association for the Study of
the Liver and the British Viral Hepatitis Group urged NICE to
reject NHS England's plea for delayed implementation.
Sofosbuvir was “less complex than existing therapies in many
regards” with “significantly less toxicity and drug-interactions
... shorter course therapies [and] significantly better efficacies.”
Consequently, “we do not believe that any significant extra
training, staffing or infrastructure are required for existing
treatment centres to adopt this technology. We strongly believe
that this technology could be safely and effectively adopted
immediately within the structures already in place.”
Ustianowski told The BMJ that, in his view, “the responses NHS
England were giving were to try to delay the process, either to
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give it more time to try to work out what to do or, if you’re
cynical, to push some of the costs into the next financial year.”
Regardless, NICE yielded. In its published guidance on 25
February 2015, it said that NHS England’s request was “based
on an arguable case.” 2
NICE told The BMJ that, though “we were not able to follow
our normal appraisal timeline in this case, [the] extended process
took account of legitimate requests for additional analysis and
consideration.”
Harvoni—battle over cost effectiveness
and budget impact
Gilead's combination treatment Harvoni was the next hepatitis
C drug to pass through the NICE system, along with two
competitor treatments, AbbVie’s ombitasvir-
paritaprevir-ritonavir (Viekirax) and Bristol-Myers Squibb’s
daclatasvir (Daklinza). They were approved in November 2015
but only after what other stakeholders describe as
“extraordinary” attempts by NHS England to persuade NICE
to reject them.
On 23 March 2015, NHS England responded to NICE's
consultation on Harvoni with a document that rang alarm bells,
not least with its conclusion that it didn't believe NICE's
proposed recommendations were “in the best interest of the
NHS at this time.”
A covering email noted the response had been prepared by the
specialist services commissioning team and, although it
incorporates comments from NHS England’s expert clinical
advisory group, “those comments do not describe a consensus
view from the clinical body as this has not been reached due to
the variety of issues facing the decision making around hepatitis
C.”
NHS England tried to stop the appraisals and introduce an 18
month delay by saying a new appraisal was needed to compare
all three oral drugs at the same time.
In further correspondence, on 1 April 2015, NHS England
estimated that if access to the drugs was given to “all patients
of all stages of disease,” treatment numbers could range from
7000 to 32 000 patients, at an estimated cost of £285m-£772m
a year. NHS England acknowledged the higher estimate of 32
000 patients was unlikely but the figures were based on
“international examples” where 40% of known infected patients
had accessed treatment.
NHS England commissioned an analysis of budget impact from
the Centre for Health Economics at the University of York. This
suggested that if £300m were diverted from the existing budget
to pay for hepatitis drugs, 1542 lives would be lost across the
rest of the NHS. For an investment in hepatitis treatments of
£700m, the toll would be 3598 lives, with the biggest toll among
patients with circulatory disease (1595), respiratory disease
(936), and cancer (262).
These figures were disputed by the patient organisation and
other consulted charities. In a joint submission to NICE, the
British Society of Gastroenterology, the British Association for
the Study of the Liver, the British Viral Hepatitis Group, and
the Royal College of Pathologists, contested NHS England’s
claims about budget impact.
In fact, they wrote, “we contest that the true figures are highly
affordable and represent excellent value for NHS England.”10
The clinical bodies added that, in the face of overwhelmingly
positive results from trials, NHS England's contention that the
evidence for the interventions was inadequate was seriously
flawed, and “at odds” with the consensus reached by its hepatitis
C clinical reference group and clinical advisory group.
The signatories clearly saw the subtext of the fight over the
hepatitis C drugs as a struggle for power between NHS England
and NICE.
“We believe that if upheld,” they wrote, “this challenge to NICE
by NHS England would fundamentally alter NICE’s role and
remit. This would potentially lead to a situation where NHS
England’s veto on the ground of potentially spurious claims of
unaffordability would deny not only hepatitis C sufferers but
people with other serious clinical conditions access to highly
cost effective therapy.”11
It is NHS England's ambition, believes Charles Gore, chief
executive of the Hepatitis C Trust, “to have NICE neutered.
Clearly it wants to get rid of the system; it does not want to have
its spend dictated by NICE.
New clinical infrastructure as rationing
instrument
NICE eventually recommendedHarvoni on 25November 2015,
with the drug in theory becoming available for all indicated
patients by the end of February 2016. But NHS England had
saved its most extraordinary manoeuvre until the end of its
campaign to stall access to the drugs.
In an apparent attempt to build on the success of its early access
programme, NHS England announced in March 2016 that it
would be “doubling the number of treatments to 10 000 patients
in 2016-17.”12But what the celebratory tone of the press release
concealed was that the “commitment” to treat 10 000 patients
through 22 new “operational delivery networks” was actually
a decision to ration the number of patients they could treat.
The new centres were given a “run rate,” the maximum number
of patients it would be allowed to treat each month in the
financial year 2016-17.13Exceed this number, they were warned,
and “the dispensing provider will bear the financial cost of
treatment.” This approach, NHS England insisted, “will ensure
hepatitis C treatment funding is used to maximise the benefit
for patients.”14
In fact, the rationing has left many clinicians facing hard
decisions and difficult conversations with patients who have
seen their treatments delayed several times.
“NHS England’s view is that it is down to each network to
prioritise patients and it envisaged it would be on severity of
liver disease,” says Ryder. “But once you’ve treated all the
patients with cirrhosis, that’s rather difficult, because by
definition everybody else doesn’t have serious liver disease yet.
It’s down to the individual physicians to prioritise and my
practice has been pretty much ‘Buggins’ turn'— if you turn up
to clinic early in the month you are more likely to get treatment
immediately than if you turn up later.”
The run rates, says Ryder, “are set entirely to hit NHS financial
targets. For this financial year we are able to treat 10 000 people,
which can be easily handled. My own experience is that we
have about a third more people who meet the criteria every
month than we have [funding] for.”
NHS England acknowledged that it considered its “planned
roll-out” of the new treatments to be “in line with the NICE
guidance,” which required networks to prioritise patients with
the highest unmet clinical need. Its “commitment” to 10 000
treatments in 2016-17 reflected both modelling used by NICE
and “the advice of clinical experts to the NICE committee that
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a realistic estimate of patients accessing treatment each year is
between 7000 and 10 000.”
Ustianowski, who runs the operational delivery network for
Greater Manchester and East Cheshire, says NHS England's
“logistical limits” are overstated. His group of five hospitals
have been given a total monthly run rate of just 50 patients,
which “is hardly anything,” he said. “We could easily do the
50 just in our hospital every month, if not a bit more, but we’re
better off than some regions ... For example, Sussex and
Brighton have something like 180 patients for the whole year,
which is absolutely ridiculous. We’re grumbling but I think
other people should be grumbling even more.”
There is now growing evidence, says Ryder, that some frustrated
patients are turning to overseas “buyers' clubs” to source the
drugs at their own expense. In November last year one
anonymous poster on the NHS website explained that, having
been refused access to treatment, “I will now purchase my
medication from fixhepc.com which is a legal way to import
Harvoni from China, where the drug is sold [for] considerable
less cost).”15
But according to Ryder, some NHS operational delivery
networks have been told they should not supervise the treatment
of people who do this, “which seems ridiculous and rather
spiteful. For one thing it takes the cost off the NHS, so if you’re
trying to get as many people treated for as little as possible and
patients are willing to pay for their own drug, why wouldn't you
support them? Co-payment is allowed in cancer treatment, why
is it any different in hepatitis C?”
Confronted with this question, NHS England said the issue was
“being looked at from a policy perspective.”
Is company pricing to blame?
Faced with the intensifying criticisms, the NHS England
highlighted Gilead's pricing as the key reason why treatment
was being delayed. A press release issued in March 2016 said
that while the NHS had made “the tough prioritisation choices
necessary to free up funds to invest significantly in new
treatments [drug companies] also need to play their part; quite
simply, making faster progress for patients in eliminating this
disease will depend on pharmaceutical companies making them
more affordable.”12
This echoed major criticisms of Gilead’s pricing strategy,
perhaps best documented in an 18 month investigation by the
US Senate Committee on Finance into the pricing andmarketing
of sofosbuvir and Harvoni in America. The US legislators
concluded that the company had adopted a strategy “designed
to maximise revenue with little concern for access or
affordability.”16This wasmade evident by the company's income
jumping from about $10bn in 2013 to over $32bn in 2015, a
year in which its revenue fromHarvoni alone amounted to $10bn
in the US and $2.2bn in Europe.
So why didn’t NHS England strike a better pricing deal with
Gilead? It refused to disclose how much it had budgeted for the
new hepatitis drugs in 2016-17, “to avoid prejudice to the
ongoing tendering processes and commercially confidential
prices agreed.” Nor would it say howmuch it was paying Gilead
for the drugs as “the publication of discounts and prices might
inhibit reductions that pharmaceutical suppliers to the NHS are
prepared to make given their commercial interests in other
markets.”
NHS England wasn’t able to enter into a risk sharing deal similar
to that agreed between Gilead and the Australian government
in December 2015. The Australian government announced it
was investing $A1bn (£600m) over five years “to give all
Australians with hepatitis C [estimated at 230 000 people] access
to breakthrough cures that could all but eradicate the deadly and
debilitating disease within a generation.” 17
A spokesperson for Gilead said such a deal in England had been
rejected “on the basis of NHS England's view that it is unable
to negotiate with pharmaceutical companies as this sits within
the remit of the Commercial Medicines Unit, reporting directly
to the Department of Health, which runs regionalised tenders
of different time periods.” This is correct. NHS England is
unable to broker specific deals with individual drug companies.
A spokesperson for NHS England declined to say why it had
deemed a deal on the Australian model inappropriate for
England but hinted that this could change. Over the next eight
months, following discussions with the Commercial Medicines
Unit, it was “exploring the potential for a longer term strategic
procurement for a supply agreement with the industry to improve
the affordability of and access to treatment further.” The
organisation would not comment in further detail “to avoid
prejudice to the outcome of these discussions.”
"Time, however, is not on the side of many patients and last
month the Hepatitis C Trust launched legal action seeking a
judicial review of the decision to limit access to the new
drugs—a decision which, it says, could have repercussions for
other patient groups as increasingly expensive drugs become
available.
“It is truly ironic that NHS England should choose to start
rationing drugs that are so effective they cure almost everyone
who is treated,” said the charity in a statement. “It feels like
people with hepatitis C are being picked on."
Legal action, said its chief executive, was “a very significant
financial risk for us but we absolutely have to stand up for the
people we are here to support. We do not want to fight the NHS
but we will fight for a fair NHS.”11
We thank Victor Roy and Lawrence King from the University of
Cambridge for their help.
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